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THE PRICE DECLINE ANOMALY IN CHRISTMAS SEASON 
INTERNET AUCTIONS OF PS3s 
  
Thomas Andrews, Cynthia Benzing, and Matthew Fehnel 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines 3,797 eBay auctions of Playstation 3s (PS3) during Christmas season 2006 to 
determine how the time remaining until Christmas and the supply of goods influence a bidder’s willingness to pay 
for a good. The number of days between the auction end date and Christmas influenced the bid, with higher final 
bids occurring earlier in the Christmas season. This evidence of a “holiday price decline anomaly” means that sellers 
who sold earlier in the holiday season were more likely to obtain higher bids than those who sold later. The final bid 
was also influenced by the eBay supply, such that the greater the number of auctions ending around the same time, 
the lower the final bid. 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
During the last decade, growth in e-commerce 
holiday sales has been unparalleled in the retail 
industry. According to the U.S. Department of 
Commerce (2010), e-commerce retail sales in the 
fourth quarter of 2006 were 24% higher than they 
were in the same quarter one year before. Online 
spending between Thanksgiving and Christmas grew 
21% between 2006 and 2007 (comScore, Inc., 2007) 
Unique names like “Cyber Monday” and “Green 
Monday” have been given to the Monday after 
Thanksgiving and the Monday two weeks later 
because e-commerce retail activity on these days is 
generally stronger than other days during the 
Christmas season. Auction sites like eBay exhibit 
similar seasonal patterns of online sales; 
consequently, they report their strongest sales during 
the fourth quarter of each year. Because auction 
markets generate quality sales data on pricing, these 
data can provide information about how buyer, seller, 
market, and product characteristics affect a 
consumer’s willingness-to-pay and final bid during 
the Christmas season. 
Data from almost 4,000 eBay auctions were 
examined to determine how supply and time to 
Christmas affected a bidder’s willingness-to-pay for 
PlayStation 3s (PS3) during the 2006 Christmas 
season. This study is one of only a few (Chan, 
Kadiyali & Park, 2007; McDonald & Slawson, 2002; 
Melnik & Alm, 2005) that explicitly includes a 
supply variable, and one of only two (Halcoussis & 
Mathews, 2007) that examines the “price decline 
anomaly” over a multi-day period culminating in an 
event. While many economists have observed the 
“price decline anomaly” in sequential auctions over 
the same day, this study examines how time to an 
event, like Christmas, might affect a bidder’s 
willingness-to-pay for a good. Only three articles 
have examined the behavior of retail prices during 
the Thanksgiving–Christmas holiday period. These 
studies (Levy, Chen, Müller, Dutta, & Bergen, 2010; 
Müller, Bergen, Dutta, & Levy, 2006; and Müller, 
Bergen, Dutta, & Levy, 2007) of food and basic 
items sold in supermarkets found greater price 
rigidity during the holiday season. This study 
explores how the willingness-to-pay for a popular 
new game system, likely to be a gift, varies during 
the holiday season when purchased through online 
auctions. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
During the last ten years, many researchers have 
studied how prices are determined in Internet 
auctions, but few have analyzed how supply and time 
until an event affect the bid price. This study uses the 
example of PS3 gaming systems to determine 
whether the willingness-to-pay during the holiday 
season is related to its supply availability on the 
Internet auction site and the number of days until 
Christmas. 
Economic theory suggests that the level of 
competitiveness influences prices. The greater the 
supply offered and the lower the demand, the lower 
the bids or price. In McDonald and Slawson’s (2002) 
study of collector Barbie doll auctions on eBay, final 
price decreased as the number of auctions ending on 
the same day increased. Melnik and Alm (2005) also 
found a decrease in the final price of coins sold at 
eBay auctions as the number of auctions ending on 
the same day increased. According to a study of 
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2,322 auctions of notebook computers in the Korean 
Internet market (Chan, Kadiyali & Park, 2007), the 
willingness-to-pay declined as the number of similar 
products listed concurrently increased. During the 
2006 holiday season, the availability of PS3s 
fluctuated due to manufacturing issues. Although the 
supply was severely limited at initial offering, the 
supply did not decline monotonically toward 
Christmas. For that reason, the eBay supply is 
examined independent of the number of days until 
Christmas. This study expects the eBay supply to 
have a significant effect on the willingness-to-pay 
with fewer offered PS3s resulting in a greater 
willingness-to-pay. 
Studies of in-person auctions have observed a 
“price decline anomaly” for sequential auctions that 
occur during the same day. Ashenfelter (1989) and 
McAfee and Vincent (1993) observed that prices in 
sequential auctions of wine decline as the auctions 
proceed, such that bidders are willing to pay more 
early in the day and less later in the day for identical 
cases of wine. This effect has been observed in 
English auctions of livestock (Buccola, 1982), real 
estate (Ashenfelter & Genesove, 1992), art (Beggs & 
Graddy, 1997) and porcelain objects recovered from 
shipwrecks (Ginsburgh & van Ours, 2007). Three 
researchers, van den Berg, van Ours, and Pradhan 
(2001), observed the same effect in Dutch auctions of 
flower bulbs. In some cases the effect has been 
attributed to the decline in the quality of lots as the 
day or auction proceeds (Beggs & Graddy, 1997). 
For auctions involving homogeneous goods, the 
effect has been attributed to auction rules that allow 
the winner of the first lot the option of buying future 
similar lots at the same price. This rule creates a 
valuable option related to the first sale. In contrast to 
the aforementioned auction studies, Raviv (2006) 
found that prices in an in-person used car auction 
actually increased early in the auction and then 
stabilized. Raviv concluded that, in car auctions, 
bidders may need to “warm up” and tend to bid lower 
at the beginning of the day. In addition, bidders take 
time to adjust to asymmetric information in the early 
rounds of a used car auction. 
The declining price phenomenon has been 
explained a number of ways. The decline in prices in 
auctions of homogeneous goods may be related to the 
opportunity cost of waiting for the next auction. 
Buyers may be willing to pay a premium equal to the 
value of the personal time saved by securing the 
product earlier. Further, buyers may be willing to pay 
a premium in an earlier auction to avoid future 
uncertainty. Risk averse buyers may be willing to pay 
more to eliminate the probability that supply may be 
even less in the future or demand and prices may be 
even higher. This study hypothesizes that the same 
day price decline anomaly will not be a determining 
factor of final bid prices in eBay auctions of PS3s. 
Because an Internet auction can begin and end at any 
time of day, the same day effect would not be 
observable because the earliest time period of the day 
is not necessarily when bidding would begin, and the 
end of the day is not necessarily when an Internet 
auction ends. In other words, the rolling effect of the 
auctions would reduce any same day effect on price. 
Only one study of Internet auctions has 
examined the price decline anomaly with respect to 
simultaneous and sequential Internet auctions over a 
number of days until the occurrence of an event. 
Halcoussis and Mathews (2007) studied the price of 
concert tickets for a rock band and found that a 
variable representing the length of time between the 
close of an auction and the concert was directly 
related to the price paid. According to Halcoussis and 
Mathews, the price declined $0.93 per day per ticket 
as the auction’s end date approached the date of the 
concert. Because the product was not usable until the 
concert, this is similar to the purchase of a Christmas 
gift that is not usable until Christmas. On the other 
hand, in contrast to a concert ticket, a PlayStation 3 
would be usable for an extended period (perhaps 
years) after the date of purchase. Also, PlayStation 3s 
may be purchased for purposes other than Christmas 
and, in that case, may not be subject to a price decline 
anomaly leading up to December 25. 
Relatively few studies have examined price 
behavior during the Thanksgiving–Christmas holiday 
period. In one study of foods and basic items sold in 
supermarkets during the Thanksgiving–Christmas 
holiday period, Müller et al. (2006) found greater 
price rigidity for private label products relative to 
nationally branded products. Examining similar 
supermarket products during the Christmas season, 
Müller et al. (2007) found that fewer new products 
are introduced or discontinued during this period. 
Lastly, Levi et al. (2010) concluded that retail prices 
of supermarket items are more rigid during the 
holiday period because of the opportunity cost related 
to changing prices. During the busier holiday season, 
stores must use more resources to stock shelves, 
answer customer questions, and ring up sales. There 
are fewer resources available to re-price products. 
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
This is the first study to examine the willingness-
to-pay for a popular entertainment system during the 
Christmas season. The newly released model of 
PlayStation was more likely to become a Christmas 
gift than the food and basic items tracked in previous 
studies. In contrast to supermarket studies by Müller 
et al. (2007) and Levi et al. (2010), the prices in an 
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auction are very flexible since they can be adjusted 
with relatively no cost to the buyer, seller, or auction 
site. This study hypothesizes that the greater 
flexibility in prices (and, consequently, final bid) 
could result in an observable pattern during a holiday 
season that extends in this case from the introduction 
of the PS3 (November 17) to seven days before 
Christmas. Since the time period culminates with a 
significant event, it is hypothesized that the “price 
decline anomaly” will be observable over the entire 
time period, such that higher final bid prices will be 
observable at the beginning of the holiday season. 
This “holiday price decline anomaly” would tend to 
exist for the same reasons as the same day price 
decline anomaly. Gift buyers are more willing to pay 
a premium to secure a popular item early in the 
holiday season to avoid the risk of paying a higher 
price later or perhaps not even obtaining the item 
because it has sold out. 
The two hypotheses tested in this study are as 
follows: 
 
Hypothesis #1: The final bid will be inversely 
related to the eBay supply of PS3s, such that 
fewer offered PS3s will result in a greater 
final bid. 
 
Hypothesis #2: The final bid will be directly 
related to the number of days until Christmas, 
such that the greater the number of days until 
Christmas the greater the final bid. This result 
would support the “holiday price decline 
anomaly.” 
 
THE DATA 
 
The data used in this study were drawn from 
eBay auctions of PS3s with at least one bidder that 
ended between November 17, 2006 and December 
18, 2006 (seven days prior to Christmas day). At the 
time of this study, eBay supplied historical auction 
data, but these data were less comprehensive than 
those available today. For instance, neither the buy-it-
now (BIN) price nor the final price was included in 
the historical information for closed auctions. The 
variables obtained for each closed auction were the 
following: the final bid, the characteristics of the 
product, shipping costs, the number of other 
competing auctions, the total number of bids, and the 
time the auction ended. 
On November 17, 2006 the much anticipated 
PS3 was released in North America. The release of 
the PS3 had been delayed numerous times in 2006, so 
Sony decided to release the game system in 
November despite its inability to meet expected 
demand. According to pricing theory, a shortage or 
constrained supply in the face of strong demand 
should lead to increases in the price of a product. The 
PS3 is an example of a product considered in short 
supply when it was released in November 2006. 
Thousands of consumers were quick to buy the 
product at the manufacturer’s suggested retail price 
only to resell it at a premium on an Internet auction 
site. These “scalpers” could choose to sell the PS3s 
immediately after release of the product or sell them 
closer to Christmas. If there exists some pattern to 
holiday retail prices, the timing decision could 
significantly influence the price or high bid received. 
All PS3 auctions with at least one bid were 
considered whether the auction resulted in a sale or 
not. Auctions do not always result in a sale if, for 
example, the seller has specified a minimum 
acceptable bid (the reserve price) and this reserve has 
not been met. Auctions that offered multiple units of 
the PS3 or other unrelated products were removed 
from the sample. Four bids that were more than three 
standard deviations outside the mean were removed 
from the sample. These bids might be the result of 
shill bidding which occurs when a seller bids on his 
or her own item to either elicit higher bids from 
potential buyers or to cancel a sale at less than the 
seller’s reserve price. Auctions occurring within 
seven days of Christmas were deleted because these 
items were less likely to be received before the 
Christmas holiday and were, therefore, less likely to 
have been purchased as holiday gifts. The number of 
remaining auctions with at least one bid was 3,797. 
The variables are defined in Table 1. The descriptive 
statistics for each variable are shown in Table 2.  
The reputation of the seller was not included in 
the dataset because reputation ratings were not 
included in eBay’s historical data summary page used 
in this study. Although reputation could have been 
obtained from the seller’s account information, the 
reputation at the time it was obtained could have been 
different from the reputation rating at the time of the 
auction. In addition, most studies (Melnik & Alm, 
2002; Melnik & Alm, 2005; Houser & Wooders, 
2006; and Lucking-Reiley, Bryan, & Reeves, 2000), 
have shown that the reputation effect is a relatively 
small component of the final price with stronger 
reputational effects for non-homogeneous items. 
The number of bidders was not available on 
eBay’s historical dataset, only the number of bids. As 
a result, the number of bids was used as a proxy for 
demand and is an imperfect measure of the number of 
customers seeking the product. Similar to Snir (2006) 
this study includes the number of bids on the premise 
that the number of bids is a reflection of bidding 
intensity and demand. 
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Table 1 
Dependent and Independent Variables  
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Description 
 
BID Final bid ($) if the PlayStation 
was not sold and price (which 
may or may not be the final bid) 
for PS3s that were sold. 
Independent 
Variables 
 
SUPPLY1 
 
The number of other PS3s being 
auctioned in the hour around that 
particular auction. 
SUPPLY24 
 
The number of PS3s being 
auctioned in the 24 hours 
around that particular auction. 
DAYS 
 
Number of days until Christmas 
as of the end of the auction. 
GB Dummy = 1 if unit is 60 
gigabytes; 0 if unit is 20 
gigabytes. 
BUNDLE Dummy = 1 if the unit includes a 
player bundle. 
GAME Dummy = 1 if the unit includes 
at least 2 games with the PS3. 
CONT Dummy = 1 if the unit includes 
an extra controller. 
MOVIE Dummy = 1 if the unit includes 
at least one movie.  
SHIP Cost ($) of shipping the PS3. 
The SHIP variable = 0 if costs 
are paid by the seller. 
NUMBIDS Number of bids 
TIME1 Dummy = 1 if the auction ends 
between 12 AM and 6 AM. 
TIME2 Dummy = 1 if the auction ends 
between 6 AM and 12 PM. 
TIME3 Dummy = 1 if the auction ends 
between 12 PM and 6 PM. 
WKEND Dummy = 1 if the auction ends 
on a weekend; 0 if the auction 
ends on a weekday. 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
(N = 3,797) 
 
Variable Descriptive Statistics 
SUPPLY1 Mean = 23; S.D. = 19 
SUPPLY24 Mean = 253; S.D. = 155 
BID Mean = $800; S.D. = $254  
GB 60GB = 53%; 20GB = 47%  
BUNDLE Bundle = 4%; no bundle = 
96% 
GAME Game = 6%; no game = 
94% 
CONT Extra controller = 5%; no 
extra controller = 95%  
MOVIE Movie = 3%; no movie = 
97% 
SHIP Mean = $32; S.D. = $32 
(Shipping paid by seller in 
27% of auctions) 
NUMBIDS Mean = 13; S.D. = 11 
TIME1 Time1 = 6%; other times = 
94% 
TIME2 Time2 = 25%; other times = 
75% 
TIME3 Time3 = 37%; other times = 
63% 
WKEND Weekend = 13%; weekday 
= 87% 
 
THE MODEL 
 
In this study, regression analysis was used to 
explain variation in the final bid prices of PS3s based 
on the (eBay) supply of PS3s, the number of days 
until Christmas, as well as several other control 
variables. As described in the literature review 
section of this paper, this study hypothesizes that 
supply will be inversely related to the final bid and a 
price decline anomaly will be observable over the 
holiday season instead of over a day. The dependent 
variable represents the willingness-to-pay (BID). BID 
is the highest observed bid for items that received at 
least one bid. For items that did not sell, BID is the 
most any participating bidder was willing to pay. For 
items that did sell, the observed sale price (BID) 
might not reflect the highest willingness to pay 
because the winning bidder need only outbid the 
second highest bidder. Any amount that the winning 
bidder was willing to pay above what was required to 
win the auction is unobserved.  
In addition to the independent variables of 
interest (the number of other competing auctions and 
the number of days until Christmas), there are other 
independent variables that must be included to avoid 
an omitted variable bias. Five of these variables are 
related to the characteristics of the PS3 and include 
the gigabytes, and whether the game system has a 
bundle, a game, a controller, and/or a movie. Further, 
prior research has identified several additional 
variables that affect final prices and/or bids in eBay 
auctions. These additional independent variables are 
  
Journal of the Northeastern Association of Business, Economics and Technology—Fall 2011 5 
 
related to shipping costs; the number of bids; and 
when the auction ends. The product variables related 
to gigabytes and add-ons are expected to be 
positively related to the final bid. Based on the results 
of prior research, the number of bids variable is also 
expected to be positively related to the final bid, 
while the shipping costs variable is expected to be 
negative. Because the results of prior research on the 
effect of time on final bid/price have not been 
consistent, we do not hypothesize signs for the 
variables related to time the auction ends. More 
detailed discussion of the independent variables and 
their expected signs will follow. 
The regression model is shown below. The 
expected sign of the coefficient appears in 
parentheses above the independent variable. 
 
 () (+) (+) 
BIDi = β0+ β1 SUPPLYi + β2 DAYSi + β3 GBi 
 (+) (+) (+) 
 + β4 BUNDLEi + β5 GAMEi + β6 CONTi 
 (+) () (+) 
 + β7 MOVIEi + β8 SHIPi + β9 NUMBIDSi 
 
 + β10 TIME1i + β11 TIME2i + β12 TIME3i 
 
 + β13 WKENDi  (1) 
 
Two supply variables were tested to determine 
the effect that the eBay supply of PS3s might have on 
final bid price. One supply variable (SUPPLY1) 
measures the total number of PS3 auctions ending in 
the hour before and after a particular auction. The 
other supply variable (SUPPLY24) is a broader 
measure that measures the total number of PS3 
auctions ending within 24 hours of a particular 
auction. Studies by Melnik and Alm (2005) and 
McDonald and Slawson (2002) also measured supply 
as the number of auctions ending on the same day. 
The supply variables used in this model are limited in 
that the eBay supply of PS3s is only a small part of 
the total supply available. The market supply of PS3s 
would include those available in brick-and-mortar 
retailers like Toys-R-Us and GameStop, as well as 
other online retailers. Unfortunately, information 
about the total market supply of PS3s on a given day 
was not available. One might still hypothesize that 
the eBay supply of PS3s might be relevant if eBay 
bidders have customer allegiance to the site and limit 
their online purchases to eBay (as opposed to other 
auction or retail sites). 
As discussed in the literature review section, the 
price decline anomaly is more likely to be observed 
over the course of the Christmas shopping season in 
that buyers might be more willing to pay higher 
prices earlier in the season to reduce the risk of not 
being able to secure the product later in the season. 
As a result, we expect the number of days to 
Christmas (DAYS) to be directly related to the 
willingness-to-pay, such that the final bid is higher 
for PS3s auctioned earlier in the Christmas season. 
A challenge with this analysis is that the product 
is not homogeneous. Consequently, the 
characteristics of each PS3 are expected to influence 
the final bid. The PS3 came in two basic models in 
2006: 20GB and 60GB (which was called the 
Premium model). One would expect the 60GB model 
to command a higher price and, therefore, a higher 
bid. Since the dummy variable for the model is 1 for 
60GB and 0 for 20GB, the sign of the coefficient for 
GB is expected to be positive. PlayStation auctions 
can also include “bundles.” Some bundles are created 
by the seller and include additional games, videos, 
and controllers. Other bundles were included by the 
manufacturer and could include specified additional 
games and possibly another controller. PlayStations 
with bundles should command higher bids. This 
study does not distinguish between manufacturer or 
seller bundles. Independent of whether the PS3 
comes with a bundle, some PS3s come with 
additional games, an additional controller, and/or 
additional movies. In other words, a PS3 may have a 
bundle and controller in addition to the bundle; or a 
PS3 may not have a bundle, but may only have an 
additional controller. If a PS3 has a bundle, 
additional games, an additional controller, and/or at 
least one movie, one would expect the bid to be 
higher. As a result, the coefficients for BUNDLE, 
GAME, CONT, and MOVIE are all expected to be 
positive. 
When shipping costs are borne by the buyer, the 
buyer is likely to adjust the bid downward to reflect 
the additional costs (McDonald & Slawson, 2002; 
Melnik & Alm, 2005). Online sellers have the option 
of paying shipping costs themselves or requiring 
buyers to pay the shipping costs. Studies have shown 
that higher nominal shipping costs reduce the highest 
bid (McDonald & Slawson, 2002). Melnik and Alm 
(2005) found that a $1 increase in shipping costs will 
decrease the willingness-to-pay by $0.55. 
Consequently, the coefficient for SHIP is expected to 
be negative. 
The bid price is expected to be positively related 
to the demand for PS3s. As a result, the coefficient 
for the variable related to the number of bids 
(NUMBIDS) should be positive. 
The effect of time of day on final price or final 
bid has been ambiguous and may be affected by the 
type of buyer and type of product. Andrews and 
Benzing (2007) found higher prices in eBay auctions 
of used cars that ended in the evening (between 5:00 
PM and midnight). McDonald and Slawson (2002) 
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found significantly lower high bids for auctions of 
collectible Barbie dolls ending between midnight and 
4 AM. Melnik and Alm (2005) found that time of day 
was not significant in online auctions of certified 
coins, but higher bids were received for non-certified 
coins sold between midnight and 6 AM. Snir (2006) 
found that used laptops auctioned later in the day on 
eBay received a lower price than similar ones offered 
earlier in the day. To make comparison with Melnik 
and Alm (2005) easier, this study broke the day into 
six hour increments such that TIME1 includes all 
auctions that ended between 12 AM and 6 AM 
Pacific time. The price decline anomaly observed in 
in-person auctions would not be related to time of 
day for PS3 Internet auctions because the auctions in 
this study are often rolling, multi-day auctions. There 
is no reason to believe that time of day will have any 
effect on the final bid. 
Previous research on whether the final bid is 
higher for auctions ending on a weekend versus those 
ending during the week has yielded conflicting 
results. Standifird (2001) and Dewan and Hsu (2004) 
found that Internet auctions ending on the weekend 
had lower final bids and/or prices than auctions 
ending during the week. Melnik and Alm’s (2005) 
study of noncertified coin auctions on the Internet 
found higher prices for auctions ending on the 
weekend. There is no reason to expect a weekend or 
weekday effect for PS3s during the holiday season. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Two regressions were performed to determine 
which variables most significantly influenced the 
final bid on PS3s during the 2006 Christmas season. 
White’s test statistic for heteroscedasticity was 
computed for the preliminary regression. The statistic 
was significant indicating that there was 
heteroscedasticity of an unknown cause. To correct 
for the understatement of the error, the regression 
was recomputed using White’s (1980) 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and 
covariance methodology. Table 3 presents the OLS 
regression results. The correlation matrix of all 
independent variables is shown in Table 4. 
The results for the first regression indicate that 
the characteristics of the PS3 as well as the shipping 
costs, eBay supply, and number of days until 
Christmas have a significant effect on the final bid 
price. As hypothesized (hypotheses #1 and #2), the 
final bid was inversely related to supply and directly 
related to the number of days until Christmas. The 
number of bids, time of day, and weekend variables 
had no significant effect on the high bid. The 
NUMBIDS variable represented the number of bids in 
an auction and is only partially representative of the 
market demand for PS3s at a given time. Had data 
been available on the number of bidders instead of 
the number of bids, the results might have shown a 
significant demand effect.  
The second regression is a variation of the first 
regression using SUPPLY24 instead of SUPPLY1. 
SUPPLY1 includes all PS3 auctions ending within 
one hour of an auction; SUPPLY24 refers to all PS3 
auctions ending within 24 hours of an auction. As 
shown in the first regression, the number of PS3 
auctions ending in the hour before or after an auction 
(SUPPLY1) was inversely related to the willingness-
to-pay. For every additional auction, the final bid was 
reduced $1.38. If the supply variable was broadened 
to include all auctions that ended within 24 hours of 
an auction (SUPPLY24), the final bid was reduced by 
$0.16 per auction. Although this may seem like a 
small nominal amount, the average number of 
auctions ending within 24 hours of an auction was an 
average of 253. This result supports hypothesis #1 
that supply has an inverse relationship to the 
willingness-to-pay.  
According to the results, buyers were willing to 
spend approximately $156–$159 more for the 60 
gigabyte version of the PS3. Bundles, extra games 
and an extra controller also added value. In contrast, 
an extra movie did not show a statistically significant 
relationship to the final bid. 
Shipping costs could be shifted to the buyer 
without a one-to-one reduction in the highest bid. For 
every dollar in shipping costs absorbed by the buyer, 
the seller only lost between $0.30 and $0.34. This 
means that it is in the seller’s interest to shift 
shipping costs to the buyer. This result is similar to 
that observed by McDonald and Slawson (2002) and 
Melnik and Alm (2005). 
Auctions that ended farther before Christmas got 
higher final bids than auctions ending nearer to 
Christmas. The coefficient for DAYS supports 
hypothesis #2, the “holiday price decline anomaly” 
for simultaneous, multi-day online auctions. As 
hypothesized, the willingness-to-pay was lower in 
later auctions of identical items. The positive 
coefficients in both regressions indicate that the final 
bid decreased by approximately $12 per day as the 
number of days before Christmas decreased. The 
results are most directly comparable to Halcoussis 
and Mathews (2007) who reported a decline in the 
price paid for concert tickets as the auction’s end date 
approached the concert date. In this study the price 
decline anomaly is consistent with buyer risk 
aversion. Buyers may be willing to pay a price 
premium earlier in the holiday shopping season to 
avoid the risk of not obtaining the item in time for 
Christmas or of paying a higher price later in the 
season. The “holiday price decline anomaly” 
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observed in this study may be stronger than that for 
most products because the PS3 game systems were in 
short supply during Christmas season 2006 and, thus, 
buyers faced greater uncertainty than they might face 
for other holiday gift items. 
From a seller’s perspective, the “holiday price 
decline anomaly” indicates that sellers of a product in 
short supply might experience higher bids earlier in 
the holiday season rather than later. It should be 
noted that, although the number of similar auctions 
on eBay was considered in the SUPPLY variable, we 
did not control for the total supply available through 
retail establishments and other auctions. In addition, 
the number of bidders was not measurable. 
Consequently, the observed price decline anomaly 
could be the result of an unobservable increase in 
total supply or a decrease in demand for PS3s as the 
holiday approached. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study shows that the willingness-to-pay in 
eBay auctions of PlayStation 3s during the 2006 
Christmas season was significantly related to the 
eBay supply of PS3s and the number of days until 
Christmas. As hypothesized, the greater the number 
of PS3 auctions on eBay ending in the hour or 24 
hours around an auction, the lower the high bid. The 
existence of a “holiday price decline anomaly” was 
also observed in that the high bid was lower for 
auctions that ended closer to Christmas. 
According to the results of this study, sellers can 
obtain higher bids on limited-supply items auctioned 
earlier in the holiday season. The reason behind this 
behavior may be related to risk aversion. Gift buyers 
may be willing to pay a premium for a gift item that 
is in short supply to avoid the risk of paying more 
later. Also, those bidders who are purchasing 
Hanukah gifts are in the market earlier in the holiday 
season and, thus, might contribute to a holiday price 
decline anomaly by increasing market demand earlier 
in the traditional Christmas season. 
Of course, one must recognize that some of the 
bidders are not purchasing the PS3 as a holiday gift, 
but are purchasing it for themselves for immediate 
use. Some “gamers” might be willing to pay more 
just to be the first to own the new version of a game 
system. In that case, there might be an observable 
price decline anomaly for any new and popular 
entertainment or technologically sophisticated item—
especially one with limited availability. Based on the 
extent of such non-holiday gift purchases, the results 
of this study may overstate the holiday price decline 
anomaly effect. More study needs to be done to better 
understand how prices behave during the holiday 
season compared to non-holiday periods. 
Economists could enhance their understanding of 
how markets work by examining how price is 
determined in online auctions. Areas of research that 
need further study include: 1) comparing the behavior 
of prices in online auctions to in-person auctions; 2) 
analyzing the behavior of prices during holiday and 
non-holiday seasons; and 3) studying the behavior of 
prices for different types of products. Compared to 
just a few years ago, much more information is 
available through market research databases supplied 
by eBay and other auction sites. Although these 
databases were designed to help sellers better 
understand their markets, they are ready-made for 
economists studying market behavior. During the 
next few years, we anticipate many other studies 
about online auction behavior. Hopefully, some will 
shed further light on the effect of auction supply on 
the willingness-to-pay as well as whether a “holiday 
price decline anomaly” exists for other products sold 
on Internet auction sites during the Christmas 
shopping season. 
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 retail spending 
Table 3 
Regression Results Using White Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance 
Dependent Variable: BID 
Independent 
Variable 
(1) (2) 
Intercept 448.40*** 
 (13.30) 
462.25*** 
(13.46) 
SUPPLY1  1.38*** 
  ( 0.24) 
 
SUPPLY24   0.16*** 
 (0.03) 
DAYS    12.41*** 
  (0.48) 
  12.20*** 
  (0.47) 
GB  159.03*** 
  (7.26) 
 155.88*** 
  (7.36)   
BUNDLE  152.48*** 
  (21.89) 
 152.27*** 
  (22.16) 
GAME  125.01*** 
  (17.18) 
 122.75*** 
 (17.37) 
CONT    40.77** 
  (17.00) 
   39.34** 
  (17.21) 
MOVIE    27.04 
  (29.05) 
   25.64 
  (29.08) 
SHIP  0.34*** 
   (0.11) 
 0.30*** 
   (0.11) 
NUMBIDS      0.06 
   (0.36) 
     0.01 
  (0.36) 
TIME1      9.01 
  (18.22) 
    7.18 
 (18.27) 
TIME2   5.86 
   (9.28) 
 6.16 
  (9.30) 
TIME3  10.88 
   (8.59) 
 8.35 
  (8.60) 
WKEND  7.01 
   (9.03) 
 8.00 
  (9.07) 
Adjusted R2   0.2924   0.2941 
SE of Regression  213.8003 213.9087 
F-statistic  121.6531 121.2348 
Prob (F-stat)      0.0000     0.0000 
 Note: The standard error appears in parentheses below each coefficient. 
 *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 ** indicates significance at the 5% level. 
 * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
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